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Works Councils: Lessons from Europe for Australia 
 
 
Herman Knudsen and Raymond Markey 
 
 
Any discussion of the viability of works councils in the Australian context needs 
to examine their operation in Europe, where they have a reasonably substantial 
history and have become an established part of the industrial relation 
infrastructure.   In recent years, works councils have also expanded their reach in 
Europe, as a result of national and supranational (European Union) initiatives.  
Reference to a European form of works councils, however, may hide marked 
differences in the structure and operations of works councils between different 
west European countries.  This article begins by examining in some detail the 
diverse European experience of works councils.  Based on that experience, it then 
explores the potential advantages of works councils in the Australian context, 
and the most appropriate form that they should take. 
 
 
The European Experience 
 
Most European countries have works council or similar bodies through which 
employee representatives are informed and consulted on management decisions, 
or even take part in such decisions. Among the 15 European Union member 
states all but Britain and Ireland have such institutions, and they also exist in 
many other European countries as for example Norway, Hungary and Slovenia. 
The spread to countries outside Europe has not been overwhelming, but it is 
interesting that South Africa has recently introduced works councils. 
 
The works council institution was originally developed in Germany and actually 
dates back to the 19th century, although it was only in 1920 that legislation made 
works councils a general feature of German industrial relations. Essentially, a 
works council is a body elected by all non managerial employees, a body entitled 
to meet with management and to be informed, consulted and involved in 
management decisions. Formally, and also to a large extent in reality, there is a 
clear division of labour between works councils and trade unions. The main 
function of the works councils is participation in management decisions, whereas 
the primary task of the unions is collective bargaining. 
 
The strongholds of works councils today are Germany, Austria and the 
Netherlands. In these countries works councils are empowered with significant 
rights to co-determination. Co-determination is a form of joint decision-making 
where the works council has to give its consent before certain types of 
management decisions can be taken and implemented. In cases of disagreement 
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between the two sides the matter is settled either by an arbitration board 
(appointed by the parties themselves) or by the labour court. 
 
In other countries with works councils, as for example Spain and Portugal, the 
right to co-determination is absent or insignificant. In Spain, however, works 
councils are entitled to conduct collective bargaining at the enterprise level. This 
mirrors the practice of illegal collective bargaining carried out under the Franco 
dictatorship by the radical workplace-oriented union, comisiones obreras. 
 
Other European countries do not have works councils in the proper sense, but 
bodies with similar functions. In France and certain other countries, legislation 
provides for joint management-employee bodies for information and 
consultation. In Italy and the Scandinavian countries the structures for 
participation in management decisions are integrated with trade union 
structures. In Italy and Denmark, the workplace bodies for consultation are not 
based on legislation, but on collective agreements concluded by the peak 
organisations at national level. In Scandinavia as well as Italy trade unionists 
have a monopoly of representation at workplace level. In the Scandinavian 
countries – whether there is a employee-side only body (Sweden) or a joint 
cooperation body (Denmark and Norway) – the institutions are manned by local 
trade union delegates (shop stewards), elected only among the trade union 
members. In Italy, all employees may take part in elections, but only the trade 
unions can put up candidates. 
 
In spite of the various forms of institutions in the different countries, it is fair to 
say that the works council is an institution with a significant impact on industrial 
relations in Europe. Termed works councils or not, almost all countries have 
introduced, usually through legislation, institutions which aims at promoting 
employee participation in management decisions. In the ‘deviant’ Danish case – 
where the form is joint ‘cooperation committees’ based on collective agreements 
– it is interesting to note that the first of these agreements was concluded in 1947, 
exactly at a time when the Danish government prepared legislation on works 
councils . 
 
Works councils have also been on the European Union agenda in the attempt to 
approximate the industrial relations of the member states to each other and to 
consolidate what is often referred to as the ‘European social model’. After many 
years of discussion the directive on European Works Councils was adopted in 
1994. It obliges management in multinational companies, if requested by 
employee representatives, to set up European works councils, comprising of 
employee representatives from the EU – and possibly other – countries in which 
they operate. The European  works council is entitled to be informed and 
consulted by corporate management on strategic and other issues which have 
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consequences for workforces in more than one country. It has a right to meet 
with management at least once a year, and more frequently if for example 
management wants to relocate production and/or jobs from one country to 
another. 
 
A further directive proposed by the EU concerns the obligation of national 
companies to inform and consult employee representatives. The aim is to 
generalize this employee right – which already exists in the great majority of 
member states – so that Britain, Ireland and coming member states will also be 
covered. The British Labour government is opposed to the proposal although the 
British trade union movement supports it. Opposition has also been voiced by 
Denmark where trade unions as well as employer organisations have expressed 
fear that the directive will endanger the voluntarily agreed cooperation 
committees. 
 
So, it is too early to say that works councils in the strict sense form part of the 
European industrial relations model. However, in a broad sense they certainly 
do: Statutory based information, consultation and cooperation at workplace level 
is an increasingly important aspect of European industrial relations. The success 
of German, Dutch and Austrian works councils and similar bodies in other 
European countries – success in terms of their contributing to highly efficient 
economies, high labour standards, a low level of indsustrial conflict, and a 
significant degree of industrial democracy) - is hardly ever doubted by observers 
within these countries. Yet, these institutions do not spread easily to other 
countries with different traditions. It seems that such cross-border fertilization 
only appears in circumstances in which important social actors in the receiving 
country have experienced a severe crisis in the traditional institutions (as was the 
case in the South African transition from apartheid). 
 
However, to import a well functioning institution from another country is 
certainly not without difficulties. For instance, if employers and employees only 
perceive their interests as conflicting and constantly fight each other to get a 
larger slice of the cake, works councils will hardly be able to flourish. The success 
of works councils is closely tied to a cooperative industrial relations climate, the 
existence of trust between the parties, and the belief that both parties can gain 
from a joint effort to make the cake bigger. It is also tied to the state as a force 
that can guarantee the long-term character of the relationship between employers 
and employees. Or, as it has been expressed by a German expert in the field 
(Müller-Jentsch 2001: 276): 
 
“From German Labour history we could see that a long learning process was 
necessary to change the antagonistic orientations of both sides of industry before 
the advantages of the works council system were recognised…Since the initial 
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risks are high for both sides, especially in traditionally adversarial labour 
relations systems, works councils can only be established by the state. Only the 
state can make this institution mandatory and position it equidistant between 
capital and labour. But whether this will work is highly dependent on the 
attitudes and social practices of the parties involved.” 
 
In order to explain this in more detail let’s take a closer look at the German 
works councils – their functions, relations to management and trade unions, and 
historical development. The co-determination through works council constitute 
one of the three pillars of German industrial relations, the two others being 
collective bargaining and employee and trade union representation on the 
supervisory boards of companies. 
The following account is based mainly on Knudsen (1995). 
 
 
Works Councils in Germany  
 
The constitution of the workplace 
Works councils in Germany are based on a rather detailed piece of regulation 
called the ‘Works Constitution Act’, in other words a constitution for the 
workplace defining the collective rights of employees as ‘industrial citizens’. The 
legislation dates from 1920, but was abandoned by the Hitler regime. In 1952 it 
was re-introduced in a strengthened version by a Christian Democratic 
government, and in 1972 it was revised at the initiative of a Social Democratic 
government. Since then the basic rules have remained unchanged. After German 
reunification in 1990 they were also introduced in eastern Germany. 
 
Employees in any establishment with at least five employees are entitled to set 
up a works council which meets with management at least once a month. 
Elections to the works council take place every four years. Often there are 
different candidate lists for blue-collar and white-collar workers. The number of 
representatives to be elected varies with the size of the workforce, from one in 
workplaces with 20 employees or less, to for instance 11 in workplaces with 
between 600 and 1000 employees, and more than 30 in workplaces with over 
7000 employees. 
 
The works council is entitled to meet during working hours and its expenses – 
including office space, other material facilities and secretarial assistance – are 
paid by the employer. The members of the council have a right to be released 
from their work tasks without loss of pay for the time necessary for performing 
their function. In workplaces with more than 300 employees, at least one works 
councillor can be released full time (ranging to 11 in establishments with more 
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than 9000 in the work force). Works council members enjoy a stronger protection 
against dismissal than ordinary employees. 
 
The works council is primarily plant based. However, when an undertaking has 
several workplaces, the works council from each workplace can appoint 
delegates to a central works council – and in groups of companies to a group 
works council. 
 
The Works Constitution Act obliges employers generally to “supply 
comprehensive information to the works council in good time”. More 
specifically, information has to be given on: 
-  the financial situation of the company, 
-  production, investment and rationalization plans, 
-  production techniques and work methods, 
-  reduction of operations and closure or transfer of production, 
-  changes in company organisation and objectives, 
-  and anything “that may materially affect the interests of the employees”. 
 
For undertakings with over 1000 employees the information must be in writing 
and be given at least quarterly. 
 
On most of these issues the works council is also entitled to be consulted by 
management. In general, consultations must take place over any plans 
concerning the construction and change of work buildings, the technical plant, 
the work process, and work operations and jobs. Similarly, the works council 
must be heard on matters relating to the size and composition of the workforce, 
training, and dismissals. Where there are more than 100 employees in the 
workforce, consultations must also take place regularly on the financial 
development of the establishment. 
 
In a number of areas the works council is empowered with a right to co-
determination. Co-determination apply in the following areas: 
- rules of order and conduct in the establishment 
- the start and termination of daily working hours and breaks, and the 
distribution of working hours over the days of the week 
- temporary reductions or extensions of the normal time 
- principles for holiday arrangements and holiday schedules 
- technical devices for monitoring the performance or behaviour of the 
employees 
- occupational health and safety 
- principles of remuneration and the introduction of new payment systems 
- the fixing of job and bonus rates and performance-related pay 
- employee surveys and personal data included in employment contracts 
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- guidelines for the selection of employees for recruitment, transfer, regrading 
and dismissal 
- guidelines for training programs and the selection of employees for training. 
 
A further area for co-determination is job design. If the employer changes jobs in 
a way which obviously is contradicting with ”established findings of 
ergonomics” concerning “human requirements”, the works council can demand 
the matter to be settled by an arbitration committee. Finally, the works council is 
entitled to negotiate with management on any change which may “entail 
substantial prejudice to the employees”. This article of the Works Constitution 
Act in particular aims at rationalizations leading to redundancies. In such 
situations management must negotiate a ‘social compensation plan’ with the 
works council through which redundant workers are helped into employment in 
other parts of the enterprise or other firms in the community, if possible, or 
offered training which may improve their chances of getting a new job. If an 
agreement cannot be reached through negotiations the case proceeds to the 
arbitration committee which is obliged to ”take into account the social interests 
of the employees concerned while taking care that its decision does not place an 
unreasonable financial burden on the company”. 
 
The individual employee is allowed to contact the works council during its 
consultation hours, without loss of pay, and may ask the council to forward 
grievances and suggestions. The Act envisages that works meetings are held four 
times a year. At these meetings the works council reports on its activities and 
discusses various issues with the assembly of employees. Meetings are to be held 
during working hours and without loss of pay. They are not public, but 
management as well as trade union representatives may attend. 
 
According to the Works Constitution Act the works council must work together 
with the employer “in a spirit of mutual trust”. It is not allowed to call strikes or 
take industrial action of any kind. 
 
The works councils in practice 
One thing is the formal rules; another is actual practice. Do German works 
councils function as envisaged in the Works Constitution Act?  
 
To an important extent they do, but not everywhere. In actual fact, only a 
minority of workplaces has a works council. Among workplaces with between 
five and 20 employees only 16 per cent have a works council. For workplaces 
with more than 20 employees the incidence is substantially higher – a recent 
study found work councils in 46 per cent of such workplaces in western 
Germany and 40 per cent in eastern Germany. And through these councils 74 
and 66 per cent, respectively, of employees were represented. 
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Studies on works councils have generally found great differences as to how they 
function. (Knudsen 1995). While some works councils are quite passive and 
mainly just accept what management proposes, others play an active role 
attempting to influence management decisions. Of the latter type, most display a 
cooperative style towards management, while relatively fewer follow a more 
confrontational road (Kotthoff 1994). Until recently it was generally found that 
most works councils did not exploit fully their formal rights. Only rarely did 
they pro-actively attempt to influence decisions on for example new technology, 
work organisation and job design; more typically, they let management have all 
the initiative and only reacted to minor details of management proposals. 
Another important feature was the clear division between issues settled by 
collective bargaining and issues discussed between the works council and 
management. 
In recent years works councils have come to play an increasingly central role. 
This is partly a consequence of the accelerating rate of change – in markets, 
technologies, production organisation and company structure, often involving 
the introduction of just-in-time principles, more flexibility in work patterns, and 
more customized products and services. Given the provisions of the Works 
Constitution Act, many types of change require the consent of the works council, 
and for change to proceed smoothly the active support of the works council is 
often essential. 
 
Partly the increased significance of the works council is connected with changes 
in the collective bargaining system. In Germany as elsewhere, employers have 
pressed for more decentralised settlements as to wages as well as working time 
arrangements in order to increase flexibility. While sector level bargaining has 
been upheld, it continues in a form where agreements increasingly include so-
called opening clauses for negotiations between management and works councils 
at the local level. For example, on working time the agreement may stipulate not 
much more than the number of working hours to be worked over a year and a 
weekly average, whereas all the detailed regulation of working time is left to the 
company level. In this way German trade unions have conceded to employer 
demands for more flexibility, and this again has given works councils a greater 
role to play. 
 
For an establishment to be flexible and able to introduce changes effectively it is 
important that it gets the backing of the works council. This often leads to whole 
package deals – often termed ‘modernisation pacts’ or ‘employment pacts’: When 
management wants to modernise production methods and work organisation it 
gets the consent from the works council, but only on the condition that a certain 
level of employment is guaranteed and certain demands to job design and 
training are met. As a consequence, works councils are no longer just buffers 
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between employees and management helping to improve social integration and 
minimize conflict, they are also active players in attempts to develop workplaces 
in ways that secure employment and improve working conditions. 
 
Trade unions and works councils – from enemies to allies 
There is no doubt that an important motive for introducing works councils in 
Germany was to diminish trade union influence. German trade unions at that 
time were quite radical, although divided in a communist and reformist wing. 
What the state wanted was to have employee interests represented in a more 
peaceful, neutral and local way than through the highly politicized and mass-
based trade unions. 
 
Hence, in the trade union movement the 1920 law was not popular. The 
communist wing of the movement considered works councils to be instruments 
for subduing workers through ‘class collaboration’. They criticized the dual 
function given to works councils, namely to represent employee interests and at 
the same time support the employer in fulfilling the goals of the enterprise; also 
they could not accept the works councils’ peace obligation. Even the somewhat 
less radical Social Democratic wing of the movement was critical of the 
legislation; not least because employee representation at the workplace level was 
defined as a non union matter and unions were excluded from operating within 
the workplace. 
 
Through the 1950s and 1960s works councils and trade unions largely were 
unconnected forms of interest representation with each their functions. Trade 
unions were responsible for collective bargaining, and sector level collective 
agreements meant that wages, working time and other distributive questions 
were solved above the level of the individual workplace. The works councils , for 
their part, represented the workforce at plant level solved specific plant issues in 
cooperation with management (Leminsky 2000). 
 
Essentially, this division of labour still exists, but not as clearly as before , partly 
because of the decentralisation and flexibility tendencies described above, and 
partly because of changing trade union strategies. With the revision of the Works 
Constitution Act in 1972 trade union officials were allowed to attend works 
council and works meetings and to have access to workplaces in general. From 
then on the trade unions took a more active interest in influencing workplace 
industrial relations. 
 
They did so in two ways. The first way was to further the election of workplace 
trade union delegates (shop stewards) as alternative representatives at shop floor 
level. The second way was to control the works councils by having trade union 
members, standing on trade union platforms, elected to the works councils. 
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While shop stewards have never become important players in workplace 
industrial relations, the other method has proved quite successful for the unions. 
In spite of the fact that only about one third of German employees are union 
members, candidates from the unions fill about three out of four works council 
seats.  
 
A recent study of works councils in Germany’s largest manufacturing sector, the 
mechanical engineering industry, found that 82.5 per cent of works councillors 
were union members and were in regular contact with their union. 70 per cent 
took advantage of external advice and support, almost exclusively from trade 
union officers. Furthermore, a large majority of works council members expected 
advice and support from their union – 87 per cent on questions concerning lay-
offs, 73 per cent on pay, and 68 per cent on flexible working time (Müller-Jentsch 
2001: 279). 
 
Given that German unions are industrial unions following the principle of ‘one 
plant, one union’ it is not exaggerated to say that works councils in reality 
function as the basic unit of trade union organisation, as “the prolonged arm of 
the union movement” (Schregle 1986: 180). This has obvious advantages for 
works councils as well as trade unions. Works councils can receive training, 
professional advice and political support from the trade union and thus better be 
able to match management in discussions and negotiations; since the late 1970s 
trade unions have been active developing policies in areas which are relevant to 
works councils such as new technology, work organisation, job design, training, 
and methods for direct participation. The trade unions, for their part, get a much 
larger representation base through the works councils than suggested by the 
actual membership figures. (This tendency is even more outspoken in Spain 
where the unionisation rate is approximately 15 per cent while almost 90 per cent 
of works councillors are members of a union (Knudsen 1995: 65). 
 
 
Lessons for Australia 
 
The major decline in the level of unionisation in Australia to 27 per cent ,and as 
little as 11 per cent in the private sector, has created a ‘representation gap’ for 
employees in the workplace.  This gap has not to date been effectively filled by 
other means, and it is not likely to disappear in the near future.  For these 
reasons it is noticeable that some recent commentators have looked towards 
other means, such as works councils of a European kind, to fill the growing void 
in collective labour institutions in Australia (notably McCallum 1997). 
 
As with other ‘Anglo’ countries such as the US and UK, Australian 
representative employee participation has been less substantially 
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institutionalised than in western Europe.  In Australia and the Anglo countries 
generally, joint consultative committees JCCs are the most common form of 
representative employee participation. These differ from statutory works 
councils in that they are usually the product of unilateral management or of 
initiative union/management agreement.  They also vary considerably in terms 
of composition, jurisdiction, powers and organisational level of operation.  They 
commonly include up to 50 per cent managers, as well as employee 
representatives.  The latter are sometimes appointed by management, sometimes 
by unions  or a combination of the two, and seem to be less commonly elected 
directly by employees.  JCCs usually have an advisory role to management, are 
often restricted in their jurisdiction to a narrow range of issues, and often have 
specific briefs for a limited period of time (task forces) (Strauss 1998: 28-9; 
Markey and Monat 1997: 1-26). 
 
JCCs received considerable encouragement in Australia from the restructuring 
and structural efficiency guidelines adopted by the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission in 1988/9.  From 1990 to 1995 the proportion of 
workplaces with 20 or more employees that had standing joint consultative 
committees more than doubled, from 14 to 33 per cent.  They are much more 
common in public sector, large and unionised workplaces (Morehead et al. 1997: 
188-9).  A similar pattern has occurred in the UK, except there the incidence of 
JCCs has actually declined since the 1980s, from 34 per cent of workplaces in 
1984 to 29 per cent in 1990 and 1998.  Survey evidence from the UK also indicates 
that many JCCs are ‘not enduring institutions of employee representation’ 
(Millward et al. 2000: 110).  
 
In comparison with works councils, JCCs suffer a number of limitations as a form 
of genuine employee representation or voice.  To the extent that they rely on 
management discretion in their formation, structure and powers, their 
limitations are clear.  Where they rely on agreement with unions, their viability 
as a general representative approach to employee voice is also severely 
constrained in Australia (and the UK and US) by the declining level of union 
coverage and the fact that a majority of employees and workplaces are not 
unionised.  In instigating JCCs, data from the Australian Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey (AWIRS) shows that Australian managers were motivated 
mainly by the desire to improve communication, improve efficiency or product 
quality and implement change, much more so than a desire to increase job 
satisfaction or employee morale.  This data also confirms that Australian JCCs 
have a relatively narrow range of issues over which they enjoy jurisdiction, 
although the important issue of work organisation is that most commonly dealt 
with (Morehead et al. 1997: 190-5).  The available evidence from case studies as 
well as surveys suggest that Australian JCCs are almost exclusively advisory, 
rather than enjoying substantial co-decision-making powers (e.g. Markey and 
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Reglar 1997: 358-88 Bertone et al. 1998; Worland 1995), and the British WIRS 
(Workplace Industrial Relations Survey) data shows a similar pattern in the UK 
(Millward et al. 111-2; also Terry 1999).  The inclusion of management 
representatives on JCCS also potentially limits their independence as an 
expression of employee voice. 
 
Survey data regarding the effectiveness of JCCs is largely positive in terms of 
achieving management objectives, for Australia and the UK.  However, this data 
should be treated with great caution.  As Palmer and McGraw note: 
 
It may well be the case that whilst managers are usually less 
represented than non-managers on JCCs they may nevertheless take an 
active role in structuring the discussion and the recommendations 
which are made.  Little can also be said concerning whether the 
discussion is simply information sharing on the part of management or 
whether it involves meaningful consultation.  Thus, it is questionable 
whether employees are empowered …, simply through their ability to 
discuss a number of issues relevant to the core business and operational 
functions of their organisation. (Palmer and McGraw 1996: 182). 
 
Palmer and McGraw also note the significance of the fact that HR managers are 
the usual survey source of data concerning the effectiveness of JCCs.  Although 
Australian union delegates largely evaluated the quality of information provided 
by management to JCCs positively, surveys based on employee views of the 
effectiveness of JCCs may produce quite different results.   
 
Given these major limitations in the structure and operations of JCCs as a form of 
employee participation, together with the strong evidence for the desirability of 
substantial forms of employee participation as a means of building workplace 
cooperation and commitment (see Gollan and Markey 2001), it seems 
appropriate to consider the introduction of works councils to Australian 
workplaces.  It is possible to identify advantages for both employers and 
employees for a works council system in the Australian context.  Under these 
circumstances, the support for works councils is potentially widespread. 
 
It is notoriously difficult to import industrial relations institutions from one 
country into another, and to expect the same positive results in the new 
environment that may be apparent in the country of origin.  The same institution 
may operate in an entirely different industrial relations culture which leads to 
entirely different outcomes.  As noted earlier, the German system of works 
councils took a considerable time to develop the acceptance and trust by 
employers, employees and their unions necessary for its successful operation 
today.  As a system it relies on a high degree of consensus or integrative 
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bargaining, but the Australian industrial relations culture has traditionally had a 
predominantly  adversarial basis. 
 
In this context it seems that the most effective way in which a generalised system 
of works councils could be developed in Australia would be through legislation. 
Without legislation which defines and guarantees their powers and composition, 
works councils may not be secure from managerial or union encroachments on 
their independence under certain circumstances, or at least may not appear to be, 
which would reduce the degree of trust, and hence, their effectiveness.  
Legislation would ensure that all works councils have the same opportunities 
and constraints.  Apart from its role in pushing sometimes reluctant 
management or unions towards a cooperative, consultative relationship at the 
workplace, a statutory system has an important role to play in ensuring the 
neutrality of participative structures, free from the impositions of whichever 
party is favoured by the balance of industrial power (see Markey and Monat 
1997: 416-7; McCallum 1997; Murakami 1999).   
 
The German model of works councils seems the most likely to achieve these 
ends.  It is an extensive system which guarantees specific structures and rights 
for the works councils.  Most importantly, the German system maintains the 
integrity of works councils separate from both employers and unions, thus 
generating a high degree of trust on both sides.  It would require national 
legislation, preferably with mirror state legislation given the significant ‘residual’ 
industrial powers of the states.   
 
A German-style system of works councils would have a number of advantages in 
the Australian context.  In the first instance, it would further the public policy 
objective of decentralisation of industrial relations processes to the enterprise 
level to maximise flexibility and efficiency.  This has been consensus public 
policy since 1988, even if it has taken somewhat different forms under Labor and 
Liberal/National governments.   
 
The second major advantage for application of the German works council system 
into Australia is that it offers a major, systematic mechanism for employee ‘voice’ 
at the workplace level, as well as protection of employee interests in the 
workplace process of change.  This has become a particularly critical issue, since 
the decline in total union density in Australia to 27 per cent means that a 
majority of workplaces have no effective employee voice.  This decline also 
means that the Swedish system of employee participation, based entirely upon 
unions, is inappropriate for Australian circumstances. 
 
Thirdly, there are advantages in separating the negotiation of workplace change 
from unions and placing the main responsibility for it under the works councils 
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in a German-style system.  This means that the employee representatives who 
are most directly affected and who have the most direct experience of conditions 
in a particular workplace become involved in the decision-making process.   
 
The German system also maximises employee job security in the process of 
workplace change and the achievement of flexibility in the workplace.  In the 
current Australian industrial relations system the negotiation of organisational 
change faces a relatively high degree of resistance from employees and their 
union representatives according to survey data.  A major reason for this has been 
the association of workplace change with job loss (Morehead et al 1997: 247-55; 
Markey et al. 2001: 285-96).  However, under the German system the works 
council has some of its most extensive rights for codetermination in relation to 
job loss as a result of restructuring, as we have seen.  In this context, the process 
of codetermination is much more likely to alleviate job loss and to bring 
employees to acceptance of restructuring. 
 
Similarly, the German works council system separates bargaining over wages 
and from the process of workplace change and the achievement of flexibility in 
the workplace.  Organisational change has considerable potential to affect wage 
rates as a result of reclassification of grades of jobs, changes to skill requirements 
or the skills mix in the workforce, and changes to the productivity, pace and 
intensity of labour.  For these reasons negotiation of organisational change is 
often closely associated with expectations over wage rates from both sides, 
particularly in the contemporary Australian institutional context where 
enterprise bargaining is the main determinant of wages and other conditions.  
However, whilst the German works councils may negotiate bonuses, shift 
allowances, and the skills mix of the workforce, general wage rates are 
negotiated at an industry level by the unions.  Consequently, general wage rates 
are removed from the consideration of flexibility and change at the individual 
workplace.  This simultaneously removes a major impediment to the successful 
negotiation of change and allows both management and works council to focus 
on more efficient work organisation itslelf.  
 
In these ways the German works council system would offer mutual advantages 
to employers and employees in the Australian context.  Employers would not 
compete on the basis of wage costs, but on the basis of achievement of genuine 
efficiencies in the workplace through workplace change.  Employees would have 
less to fear from organisational change and the development of greater 
workplace efficiency if it was not so closely associated with job loss or variations 
in wages. Because of this, they would be less likely to be resistant to change.   
 
More generally, Australian employers could benefit from a works council system 
in a number of ways.  The extension of employee voice in the decision-making 
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process, often where none exists at all, extends the range of expertise informing 
decision-making.  It also fosters employee cooperation and commitment to the 
outcomes of decision-making in the workplace. Most importantly, a works 
council system would encourage a consensual, integrative approach to important 
aspects of workplace negotiations, such as flexibility, and individual employee 
cases, which otherwise are likely to be resolved through a more adversarial 
system involving unions. 
 
Participation begets participation: a large body of international survey and case 
study evidence now indicates strongly that the successful implementation of 
direct forms of participation, such as teamwork, quality circles and Total Quality 
Management programs, are facilitated by systems of representative participation 
such as works councils (Markey 2001: 9; Murakami 1999).  Theoretical 
explanations of the role of direct participative mechanisms of this kind in 
promoting efficiency and innovative work patterns have been supported by a 
range of empirical data, such as the recent EPOC (Employee Participation in 
Organisational Change) survey of European Union countries (EPOC 1997).  
AWIRS also revealed that Australian employers were adopting direct 
participative practices at a high rate, with almost half of workplaces surveyed 
practicing team building and well over a third implementing semi or fully 
autonomous work groups and total quality management.  These managers 
claimed that workplace performance improved in 84 per cent of cases, that 
product or service quality improved in 82 per cent of cases, that communication 
between managers and employers improved in 75 per cent of cases, and that the 
ease with which change was introduced improved in 73 per cent of cases where 
direct participative practices were employed.  The same survey revealed a strong 
correlation between representative forms of participation – mainly JCCs – and 
unionisation in workplaces where direct participation had been implemented 
(Morehead et al. 1997: 325-6; Markey et al. 2001: 241-2;).  The EPOC survey also 
showed a strong correlation between the success of direct participative practices 
and the incidence of representative participation, predominantly works councils.  
EPOC demonstrated 
 
the importance of employee and employee representative involvement in 
the regulation of direct participation in order to improve both the quality 
of the participation itself and its economic and social effects.  Far from 
being a barrier to progress, it seems, employee representatives are agents 
of change.  The greater their involvement, in terms both of form and 
extent (and this applies particularly to negotiation and joint decision-




Australian employers, therefore, could expect to benefit in the implementation of 
team work and other forms of direct employee participation designed to improve 
efficiency and quality, through the introduction of a more systematic and 
extensive form of workplace representative participation, such as works councils. 
 
In the German case, the unions initially opposed the introduction of works 
councils, which were partly motivated by the desire to provide an alternative 
form of employee voice more tied to the interests of the enterprise.  Australian 
unions, and their counterparts in other Anglo countries, have traditionally been 
deeply suspicious of representative forms of employee participation along these 
lines: that even if they are not designed to do so, they will effectively undermine 
union loyalty in the workplace by providing an alternative voice for employees 
(Markey 1989).  This problem would become exacerbated for unions and 
employees if works councils became incorporated into management, which is 
precisely what unions have feared especially because of the relative power and 
resource imbalance between an employer and employees in one enterprise 
(Markey and Monat 1997: 3).  In the US this fear focused upon the potential for 
company unions which employers used to undercut genuine employee 
organisations in the 1920s, and as a result the National Labour Relations Act of 
1935 effectively bans any company representative bodies (see Dunlop 
Commission 1994 Part II). In addition, unions have traditionally been concerned 
with the prospects for ‘workplace egoism’, whereby employees in particular 
workplaces may be supportive of enterprise initiatives which undercut broader 
industry policies of unions, because of atypically negative or positive 
performance of their own particular enterprise.  For example, a firm undergoing 
financial or market difficulties may be able to persuade employees that it is in 
their interest to accept flexible approaches to industry standards regarding lower 
wages or extra hours, which would have the effect of applying competitive 
pressure to other firms in the industry to follow suit (see Strauss 1998a: 126-34; 
Frege 1999: 43-53, 74). 
 
However, notwithstanding these potentially negative impacts, unions generally 
are likely to benefit from a works council system with the appropriate checks and 
balances.  As noted earlier the vast majority of works councillors in Germany, 
and most other European countries where they exist, are union members, even 
though only a minority of the workforce is unionised.  Union activists are, by 
definition, likely to be more industrially active and visible in the workplace, to 
have objectives which they wish to pursue, and to network more effectively than 
non-unionists.  This means that in practice unions may have an indirect influence 
on works councils.   
 
The German and European experience generally also suggests that works 
councils commonly work in partnership with unions, especially in sharing of 
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data.  In particular, the unions can provide the councils with research data 
relating to the industry and economy as a whole, nationally and internationally, 
which works councillors would not otherwise be able to access easily.  Unions 
also have the networking capability to link work councillors from different firms 
so that they can share data and experiences (see especially Veersma and 
Tegelaers 1997: 67-86; Hege and Dufour 1995).  In these ways unions can actually 
reach a wider proportion of the workforce than just union members, and the 
relationship may even assist unions in recruitment of members. For all of these 
reasons German unions are now fully supportive of works councils.  Australian 
unions could also benefit from them in the same ways, as was recognised in 
Unions 2000. 
 
The manner in which the division of powers and authority is structured between 
German works councils and unions may also provide wider benefits to unions 
and employees.  Whilst works councils have autonomy over non-wage issues in 
the workplace, general standards and wage rates are regulated by industry level 
collective bargaining.  This means that whilst the works councils maximise 
flexibility at the workplace level, there is also a high degree of centralised 
determination of wages and standard conditions such as working hours.  In the 
Australian context this would imply a strengthening of the award system, 
without necessarily reducing enterprise flexibility.  One instance of how this 
could operate successfully in achieving dual objectives is provided by the 
implementation of reduced working hours in Germany during the 1980s.  The 
hours reduction was negotiated on an industry level, on the basis of a standard 
37.5 hour week, or 35 hours in the metals industry.  However, it was left to the 
works councils to negotiate at enterprise level the implementation of this 
standard, and a variety of approaches were adopted.  These included a daily 
reduction in hours, a four and a half day week, a nine day fortnight, and longer 
annual leave (Jacobi et al. 1992: 250-1).  Such flexibility is clearly of benefit to 
employers as well as employees. 
 
Finally, the introduction of German-style works councils into the Australian 
industrial relations system could be achieved relatively easily within the existing 
institutional infrastructure of the industrial relations commissions at state and 
federal levels.  These tribunals are well-equipped to undertake the role of the 
German Labour Court in resolving intractable disputes between works councils 
and employers where the councils have the right of co-determination.  In doing 
so they also often establish minimum general standards through test cases.  The 
Australian tribunals have long experience and considerable expertise in dealing 
with workplace issues such as restructuring and even unfair dismissals, which 
are likely to arise if we adopted the German system.  However, the attraction of 
the German system is that its rationale is to encourage a consensus approach to 
these workplace issues by dealing with them at the workplace level rather than 
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through unions in a more adversarial framework.  The German Labour Court, 
therefore, is only a last resort applied in a small minority of cases which 





European style works councils and other forms of representative employee 
participation at the workplace level have wide support in a number of countries 
in Europe, amongst both employers and unions. There is considerable evidence 
that representative forms of participation help build employee commitment and 
cooperation, and facilitate ‘high-trust, low conflict relations’ between 
management, workers and unions.  In addition, it is clear that representative 
participation is also strongly associated with effective forms of direct 
participation which are designed to enhance productivity and efficiency 
outcomes in the workplace.  At the same time, the decline in union membership 
in Australia has created a major ‘representation gap’ which could be partially 
filled by an extensive system of workplace employee representation.  The joint 
consultative committees which have become common in Australian workplaces 
in recent years have many drawbacks in providing the systematic approach to 
representative participation which is desirable. This is especially the case because 
they have not spread beyond a substantial minority of workplaces, their genuine 
independence from management is often questionable, and their powers in 
relation to management are too limited to offer a substantial employee voice in 
decision-making.  For these reasons a systematic approach to representative 
participation in Australian workplaces is worth considering as an important 
matter of public policy.   
 
The German style of works councils, operating in a system of co-determination 
defined by law, seems to offer particular advantages for the Australian context.  
The intervention of the state in this way structures an even-handedness which 
lies at the heart of the German system, and fosters the high degree of trust from 
employers and employees and unions which is necessary for the success of a 
system of this kind.  In order to build the support necessary from both parties, it 
would be essential to maintain the clear separation of the works councils from 
both management and unions which characterises the German system. 
 
The adoption of this system offers substantial advantages to employers, 
employees and unions in Australia, and the existing industrial relations tribunals 
have the necessary expertise to provide support.  Employers would clearly 
benefit from the potential of works councils to improve flexibility and 
productivity and facilitate direct participative practices such as teamwork, in the 
workplace. The works councils structure also tends to remove some of the main 
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sources of employee resistance to workplace change.  Consideration of wages are 
removed from the provenance of workplace change and flexibility in a 
centralised industry level system of wage determination collective bargaining 
with unions.  Employment security is one of the strongest  areas of works council 
codetermination power.  These same factors offer much to employees and 
unions.  Nor would unions necessarily have much to fear from works councils 
displacing their role and appeal to members, since unionists tend to be elected to 
works councils in far greater proportion than their general membership density.  
Indeed, the European experience reveals the potential for unions to develop 
strong partnership relations with works councils which would enable unions to 
indirectly reach a much greater proportion of the workforce than their own 
membership.  The lessons from Europe point to a genuine win-win outcome 
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